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Abstract
This paper develops a novel account of the nature of blame: on this account, blame 
is a species of performance with a constitutive aim. The argument for the claim that 
blame is an action is speech-act theoretic: it relies on the nature of performatives and 
the parallelism between mental and spoken blame. I argue that the view scores well 
on prior plausibility and theoretical fruitfulness, in that: it rests on claims that are 
widely accepted across sub-disciplines, it explains the normativity of blaming and it 
accounts for associated psychological phenomena.
Keywords Blame · Performance · Performative · Standing to blame
1 Introduction
You1 left the kitchen door open and my cat ran out. Needless to say, while walk-
ing through the rain trying to find the poor thing, I’m not entertaining exception-
ally happy thoughts about you. Do I blame you for what happened? Of course I 
do! According to the view I will develop here, when I blame you for having left 
the kitchen door open, I am actively doing something to you, in response to your 
negligence.
This paper develops, and investigates the credentials of, a novel account of the 
nature of blame: on this account, blame is a species of performance (henceforth 
Blame as Performance, or BaP for short). The rationale for the claim that blame 
is an action2 is speech-act theoretic: it relies on Austinian claims about the nature 
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of performatives and the parallelism between mental and spoken blame (#2). After 
developing the view, I move on to outlining its theoretical virtues: first, I appeal 
to general performance normativity to advance a novel view of the normativity of 
blaming, i.e. what it is to have standing to blame (#3). Second, I give an overview of 
the difficulties traditional analyses of blame encounter in trying to dismantle blame 
and show that BaP neatly explains both the intuitions behind, and the difficulties 
encountered by traditionalism (#4). Third, I show how BaP is better positioned to 
account for blame’s function than functionalist analyses of blame (#5). Last, I con-
clude by showing that BaP also nicely accounts for the psychology of blame (#6).
2  Blame as performance
2.1  Methodology
Traditionalism about blame has difficulties coming up with an analysis of blame. 
The traditionalist model is a dismantling model of analysis: it tries to understand 
this complex phenomenon by breaking it down into simpler elements that are inde-
pendently understood. Cognitivist dismantling proposals3 take blaming to be tan-
tamount to judging blameworthy; they are thought by many to fail to capture the 
affectivity of blaming.4 Emotivist accounts5 seem to go too far in the opposite direc-
tion, and lose blame’s normative diversity in the process: emotional responses do 
not seem appropriate for some types of blameworthy wrongdoings, such as epis-
temic, prudential or minor moral wrongdoings.6 Conative, desire-based accounts are 
thought to inherit the ups and the downs of both cognitivism and emotivism.7
More recently, blame functionalism (e.g. Fricker 2016; Duff 1986; Sliwa 2021; 
Vargas 2013) rejects traditionalist methodology: the claim is that one plausible 
explanation of these historical difficulties lies with the fact that blame is just too 
complex a phenomenon to afford an (interesting) dismantling analysis. As such, sev-
eral recent proposals in the literature try to shed new light on the nature of blame 
by looking at the function of what is taken to be the paradigmatic case of blame: 
communicative blame. This way of proceeding leaves open the particular attitude 
or combination of attitudes that constitute blame. In this way, functional accounts 
can be more flexible. These philosophers advance views about the communicative 
function of the practice of blame and how this serves to inform us about its nature. 
One notable worry for this move relates to the fact that attempts to offer a functional 
analysis of blame commonly start with the communicative function of the practice 
3 E.g. Haji (1998), Hieronymi (2004), Scanlon (1986), Smart (1961), Watson (1996) and Zimmerman 
(1988).
4 For arguments against the necessity and sufficiency claims involved in the cognitivist analysis, see Sec-
tion #5 and (Kenner 1967; Coates and Tognazzini 2012, Pickard 2013).
5 Bell (2013), Strawson (1962), Wallace (1994) and Wolf (2011).
6 See Section #5 and Brown (2017) and Brown (2018).




of blaming. However, it is argued, many (perhaps most) instances of blame are not 
expressed or communicated. In what sense are those instances of blame commu-
nicative? And if they are not, how can blame be essentially communicative in its 
nature?8
This paper investigates a novel lieu in the logical space: it combines function-
alist and traditionalist methodology to arrive at a novel account of the nature of 
blame: Blame as Performance. Like the functionalist, I abandon the ambition to 
offer a dismantling analysis of blame, and I begin by looking at the paradigmatic 
case of blame: communicative, spoken blame. Unlike the functionalist, and like the 
traditionalist, however, my interest lies with the nature rather than the function of 
communicative blame. That is because, as I will argue, the nature of communicative 
blame is informative with regards to the nature of blame simpliciter.
2.2  The speech‑act theoretic rationale for the performance claim
This section argues that, conditional upon Austinian speech act theory being broadly 
right about the nature of the speech act of blaming, the phenomenon under discus-
sion—blame—pertains to the category of performances.
To this effect, it will be useful to first have a look at the nature of the speech 
act of blaming and its relationship to mental blame. To put my cards right on the 
table, in line with a significant number of philosophers working on the nature of 
blame (e.g. Fricker 2016; Duff 1986; Sliwa 2021) I would like to suggest that spo-
ken blame is the outer counterpart of inner blame, just like, for instance, assertion is 
(widely taken to be) the outer counterpart of judgment (e.g. Douven 2006; William-
son 2000). The thought is roughly that, since assertion is our characteristic way of 
expressing judgments, the one is the inner counterpart of the other. What I want to 
suggest is that the same motivation will do the needed work for blaming: plausibly, 
since spoken blame is our characteristic way of expressing mental blame, the one 
is the outer counterpart of the other. To be clear, the claim here is not that, in either 
case, the mental and the spoken need to coincide: I can assert that p without judg-
ing that p, and the other way around. Similarly, I can blame you in speech but not 
in thought, and I can mentally blame you without putting it in speech. The claim is 
rather one of metaphysical parallelism. Here it is9:
The Mental Blame-Spoken Blame Parallel (MBSB): Mental blame stands to 
spoken blame like the inner to the outer.
What we have on this picture, then, it’s a type—blame simpliciter—of which 
mental and spoken blame are the subvocalized and, respectively vocalized species. 
Note, further, that if MBSB holds, the nature of outer blame will shed light of the 
nature of mental blame, since one is the subvocalized incarnation of the other (and 
the other way around).10 Furthermore, the nature of blame simpliciter will be easy 
8 See Section #5 and Tognazzini and Coates (2018).
9 E.g. Williamson (2000), Douven (2006) and Sosa (2013).
10 Similarly, if the belief-assertion parallel holds, the nature of assertion will be informative vis a vis the 
nature of judgment. For instance, if one has an account of assertion according to which assertion is XYZ, 
one can easily derive an account of judgment as sub-vocalized XYZ (e.g. Douven 2006).
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to derive by merely removing the species-specific properties—the ‘mental’ and 
the ‘spoken’. In a nutshell, if we know what kind of entity outer blame is, via the 
assumption of metaphysical parallelism, we can come to know what kind of entity 
mental blame is as well, and indeed, what kind of entity blame simpliciter is.
Given all this, what I will do next is try to shed light on the nature of outer blam-
ing, which will, in turn, inform what I will take to be the nature of mental blame and 
blame simpliciter.
In order to do that, it will be useful to start by distinguishing between the speech 
act of blaming and the speech act of explicitly blaming. One can blame another by 
merely saying something along the lines of: ‘You should not have left the kitchen 
door open, that was really not very considerate of you! It’s your fault that my poor 
cat ran out!’. Alternatively, one can also blame another explicitly: ‘I blame you for 
what happened to my cat!’.
Crucially for my purposes, the speech act of explicitly blaming is notably taken 
by Austin (1955) to be a performative speech act. Performative speech acts have 
double direction of fit: When I utter ‘I blame you for being late for lunch!,’ I perform 
two actions: I describe the world (word to world fit), in that I assert that I blame you 
for being late for lunch; and I change the world (world to word fit), in that, in making 
this speech act, I thereby blame you for being late for lunch (now you are blamed). 
Classical examples of performatives include promising, marrying, ordering and bap-
tizing. When I utter ‘I promise to be there,’ I describe the world and change it at the 
same time: I will thereby have promised to be there (now I have an obligation to 
be there), and asserted the fact that I promise to be there. Similarly, when (granted 
that I have the relevant aut1989hority) I utter ‘I hereby declare you man and wife,’ I 
will have thereby changed the world—now you are married—and described it—by 
asserting that I am marrying you (Searle 1989). In Anscombe’s famous comparison, 
the shopper tries to fit his purchases to his shopping list, while the detective shadow-
ing him tries to fit her list to his purchases (1957: p. 56). Performatives do both.
How do performatives achieve this double direction of fit? Well, as the name sug-
gests, they are speech acts that perform: they are acts that act. Performative utter-
ances are performances of the act named by the performative verb (Searle 1989). 
In uttering those sentences, one asserts that one is at the same time promising, or 
christening, or declaring war, and thereby additionally does these things (Ginet 
1979; Dummet 1993). There are two actions involved in a performative: the asser-
tion and the action that it performs: the assertive speech act of marrying (describing 
the worldly fact that I am marrying you) and the marrying itself (the world-changing 
intervention), the assertive speech act of promising (describing the worldly fact that 
I am promising) and the promising itself.
If Austin is right, and the speech act of explicitly blaming is a performative, then, 
it needs be the case, like with all performatives, that there are two actions involved 
in the speech act of explicit blaming: the assertive speech act (describing the worldly 
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fact that I blame you) and the world-changing act it perform—that of blaming. 
When I utter ‘I blame you!,’ I both describe what I’m doing—the fact that I blame 
you—, and doing it: I thereby blame you. There are two acts involved in this speech 
act, the assertion and the blaming itself. Crucially, if that is the case, blame is an act, 
a performance. When I blame you for being late for lunch, I am not only performing 
a speech act, I am actively doing something to you. I am not just having an attitude 
towards your wrongdoing/making a judgment about it, I’m actively doing something 
to you in response to it. Just like in the case of promising, marrying or baptizing, if 
explicit blaming is a performative, then blame is a species of action.
What does this tell us about the nature of mental blame? Recall that, drawing on 
an analogy with judgment and assertion, I took mental blame to stand to spoken 
blame like inner to outer. What this amounts to is a metaphysical parallelism claim: 
mental blame is the same kind of entity as outer blame, only located in a different 
environment. If that is the case, and if outer blame is an action, mental blame will 
follow suit: it will be the sub-vocalized counterpart of outer blaming, i.e. a mental 
act. Again, importantly, inner and outer blame can be present independently of each 
other. I can blame you in speech but not in my mind, and I can also blame you in my 
mind but stay silent about it.
Finally, we have seen that, in virtue MBSB, the nature of blame simpliciter will 
be easy to derive by merely removing the species-specific properties of mental and 
spoken blame. Thus, again, conditional upon Austin’s view about the speech act of 
blaming being right, in line with marrying, promising, ordering etc., blame is a per-
formance that can take inner (mental) and outer (spoken) shape.
What kind of performance is blame? In line with Miranda Fircker (2016), I want 
to say it is a sui generis phenomenon—in my view, a sui generis performance—, 
that does not admit of a full dismantling analysis. As such, when I say that blame is 
a performance, I cannot further explain what it does11: that’s just what it is for it to 
be a sui generis performance.12 That is not to say, however, that we cannot say fur-
ther interesting things about its nature.13 What can we say further about the nature of 
blame as performance? Note that blaming is a three-place predicate: when I blame, I 
blame someone for something. This suggests that blame constitutively aims at track-
ing14 some normative failure on the part of the blamed. To see this, note that blam-
ing is essentially criticisable (i.e. all instances of blaming are thus criticisable) if 
it fails to achieve this aim, i.e. if it either fails to hit upon a normative failure, or it 
fails to target its proper source. Essential criticisability is strong evidence of norm 
and/or aim constitutivity. Of course, actual wrongdoing need not be present: we are 
11 Other than that, trivially, it blames.
12 Compatibly, I think that paradigmatically (although not analytically) blame does serve a role akin to 
what (Scanlon 2008) takes it to serve in modifying the relationship between the blamer and the blamee.
13 Compare: Williamson (2000) takes knowledge to be non-analyzable, but ventures, nevertheless, to 
shed light on its nature by taking it, among other things, to be a mental state in its own right.
14 A stronger view would be one on which blame doesn’t merely aim at tracking normative failure (since 
this can happen by lucky correlation), but rather at responding to normative failure. I am myself unde-
cided about which is the correct way to think about this, and indeed am happy with both accounts. Many 
thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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not infallible blamers, I can mistakenly, wrongly blame you. But I cannot blame for 
nothing, nor can I blame you for doing something perceived to be good: I cannot 
blame you for saving the world, it is conceptually weird.
On a first approximation, then, blame constitutively aims at tracking normative 
failure, at tracking norm breach. Aim-constituted activities can occur even when 
they fail to achieve their constitutive aim. What makes the aim constitutive as 
opposed to merely conventional is the fact that, necessarily, all occurrences of the 
aim-constituted activity in question fall short when they fail to reach the correspond-
ing aim. When I mistakenly or wrongly blame you, my blaming will fall short in not 
having achieved its constitutive aim.
There is more to this, however: wrongdoing is not enough for blame. Blame is 
about the wrongdoer not the wrongdoing. When I blame you for being late for lunch, 
I don’t merely criticize your action, I also hold you responsible for it, or take this 
wrongdoing to be attributable to you. Again, blaming is a three-place predicate: I 
blame you for something. Constitutively, then, blame is a second-personal type of 
performance: when I blame, I blame someone (or something). In virtue of being 
a second-personal type of performance, blame is directed at the wrongdoer, not 
merely at the wrongdoing.
In sum, then, here is the account I would like to put forth:
Blame as Performance (BAP): Blame is a performance constitutively aimed at a 
wrong-doer for a wrong-doing.
On this view, in virtue of being a performance essentially targeting a wrong-doer, 
it will be a person-affecting negative-response performance, or retributive practice, 
analogous with actions like punishment or downgrading.
Importantly, second-personal need not imply other-personal: I can blame myself. 
Also, second-personal need not imply any actual encounter with the blamed party. 
I can blame the dead and the distant. When I blame Hitler for the Holocaust, I do 
something to him even though he’s dead. The same goes when I blame people I have 
never met, who live on another continent, whose bad acts I’ve heard about in the 
news. To see this, note that ‘my doing something to someone S’ need not imply that 
S is present in my near proximity, that they’re alive, or that I’ve ever met them. I’m 
doing something (good) to Shakespeare when I put on a festival in his honour; after 
all, I’m doing something good to his reputation, memory etc. Similarly, I’m doing 
something (bad) to Celine Dion when I discourage my daughter from listening to 
her albums, even though I’ve never met Celine Dion.
Before closing the part of the paper that develops the account, I would like to 
consider the following question: This section has been framed as a conditional 
throughout: if Austin is right, then blame is an action. What happens if Austin was 
wrong about the speech act of blaming, though? A few things about this: First, to 
date, to my knowledge, Austin’s view on the issue has remained unchallenged. I take 
this to be at least some evidence that not many philosophers thought it outrageously 
false. Second, note that I don’t need a full blown Austinian view on the speech act of 
blaming in order to have support for my account: all I need is the milder claim that 
explicit blaming can, at times, be a performative.15 Since that can only be the case 
15 Other performatives often believed to waver between performative and descriptive usage include 
admit, argue, conclude, predict, estimate.
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if blaming itself is an action, the view is vindicated. Compatibly, it may well be that 
blaming waivers between descriptive and performative usages. The latter claim—the 
claim that blaming can be a performative is fairly uncontroversial to my knowledge. 
After all, it survives the famous ‘hereby test’ for performatives16: one can sensi-
cally utter ‘I hereby blame you’ in the same way in which one can sensically utter 
‘I hereby marry you.’ The latter does not work on pure descriptives: ‘I hereby have 
blue eyes’ makes no sense at all.
Last and most importantly, I take the hypothesis that blame is an action—rather 
than a judgment, emotion and so on—to be worth exploring in its own right, inde-
pendently of the speech-act-theoretic motivation. To see that this is so, it would be 
useful to read the following sections that outline the many theoretical virtues of the 
view.
3  What BaP explains: the normativity of blaming
The account of blame proposed in the previous section is independently motivated, 
based on two very minimal, fairly uncontroversial theses: the inner blame/outer 
blame parallel and the (at least at times) performative nature of the speech act of 
blaming. If these two theses hold, the account I have offered above follows.
The next sections will offer yet several other reasons to prefer my account over 
the competition, all pertaining to BaP’s theoretical fruitfulness. This section focuses 
on how the account explains the normativity of blaming.
I have proposed that blame is a sui generis species of performance. When I blame 
you for being late for lunch, I am actively doing something to you: I am engaging 
in a you-affecting negative-response performance constitutively aimed at a you as a 
wrong-doer for a wrong-doing of yours. If all this is the case, we are now in a posi-
tion to develop an account of the normativity of blaming: it will be an instance of 
performance normativity. One important theoretical upside of this account, thus, is 
that it can rely on the general normativity of performances in order to explain the 
normativity of blame. The normativity of performances has been thoroughly theo-
rized by competence-theorists in the last decades.
The most widely discussed articulation of performance normativity in the lit-
erature is Ernest Sosa’s AAA–model of performance assessment (Sosa 2007: pp. 
22–23).17 On this approach, we can assess performances for accuracy, adroitness, 
and aptness. Accurate performances achieve their aim, adroit performances mani-
fest competence, and apt performances are accurate in virtue of being adroit: their 
success manifests competence. This AAA-model applies to all conduct and perfor-
mances with an aim, whether intentional (as in ballet) or unintentional (as with a 
heartbeat). To see the motivation behind the model, take the case of archery: the 
16 See also e.g. Levinson (1983) and Thomas (1995) for discussion.
17 For related but subtly different approaches, see Greco (2003, 2010) and Morton (2013).
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success condition in archery is hitting the target. Success can happen by accident: I 
can hit the target even though I have not shot an arrow before, just by dumb luck. If 
that happens, my shot will be an accurate shot.
In the case of archery shots by professional archers, though, competence is 
involved: professional archers have a reliable disposition to hit the target in normal 
conditions (good lighting, friendly weather etc.). When a competent archer success-
fully hits the target, the shot is both accurate and adroit. This is not all there is to 
performance normativity, though: to see this, consider a case in which a professional 
archer competently releases the arrow, which then heads straight towards to bulls 
eye; alas, a gust of wind takes it off course. Luckily, a second gust of wind sets the 
arrow back on its track, and the arrow hits the bull’s eye successfully. In this case, 
the performance is both accurate and adroit, but its accurateness fails to manifest its 
adroitness: it is accurate by luck, in spite of the fact that it is competent. Contrast 
this scenario with one where all goes well: the competent archer releases the arrow, 
and, in virtue of the manifestation of her competence, the arrow hits the bull’s eye. 
According to Sosa, when all goes well, performances are not merely accurate and 
adroit, but also apt: they are accurate in virtue of being adroit.
Let us go back to Blame as Performance. I want to argue that Sosa’s AAA struc-
ture will give us an account of apt blaming that will be instrumental in accounting 
for what the literature dubs ‘standing to blame.’ Many philosophers think that blame 
is a normatively appropriate response only when the blamer has standing to blame. 
In turn, one widely endorsed condition for having standing to blame is the non-hyp-
ocritical condition18: X has standing to blame only if X has not herself engaged in 
similar wrongdoing in the past.19 While the vast majority of blame theorists agree 
that hypocrisy negatively affects one’s capacity for permissible blaming—indeed, 
non-hypocrisy is taken by most to be the paradigmatic example of a condition for 
18 For recent work on this, see e.g. Fritz and Miller (2018), Rossi (2018) and Todd (2021).
19 For a helpful overview, see (Bell 2012). Bell identifies three more conditions that have been proposed 
in the literature for standing to blame: one is Y’s wrongdoing is X’s business. That is, X has an identifi-
able stake in Y’s wrongdoing. Bell calls this the Business Condition. The second asks that X and Y by 
contemporaries and inhabit the same moral community (the Contemporary Condition). The third is a 
Non-Complicity condition: it asks for X not to be responsible for or complicit in Y’s wrongdoing. I will 
not discuss these conditions here, and here is why: First, they are not as widely endorsed as the non-
hypocrisy condition. Second, I find all of them problematic in ways: I strongly disagree with the defend-
ers of the Contemporary Condition: it seems to me perfectly appropriate for me to blame Hitler, even 
though I am, luckily enough, not his contemporary. I also don’t like the Non-Complicity condition: I can 
blame you as well as myself for being (together) late for our lunch with our friend. What seems inappro-
priate is only blaming you and not myself, not blaming you per se. Last, when it comes to the Business 
Condition, I agree that blaming might be socially inappropriate in case when it seems the matter is none 
of my business, but I think that is easily explained by overriding social norms having to do with privacy 
considerations. That is, I believe that, in these cases, blame is appropriate, but uttering the corresponding 
speech act might be all-things-considered socially inadequate, due to further norms stepping in. See (Bell 
2012) for further arguments against these conditions.
 That being said, I don’t think much hinges on whether I am right about this: I am confident that, by 
taking blame to be a species of action, BaP can have a good story to tell about any plausible way in 
which standing to blame may be lacking, in virtue of the richness of the performance normative frame-
work. I will, however, restrict discussion here to the Non-Hypocrisy condition, since it is the most widely 
endorsed such condition in the literature.
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one’s standing to blame—it has been notoriously hard to satisfactorily account for 
why this might be so. Most crucially, it has been notoriously hard to offer an account 
of standing to blame that both naturally drops out of the particular account of blame 
proposed, and, at the same time, is general enough to accommodate plausible con-
ditions on standing to blame in a non-ad hoc manner (see Tognazzini and Coates 
2018 for an excellent overview). In a nutshell, the main problem most accounts on 
the market face is the following: accounting for the badness of hypocritical blam-
ing is easy: after all, plausibly, it lies in the nature of hypocrisy that, for most phi, 
hypocritically phi-ing is bad. It is easy then, whatever one’s account of the nature of 
blame, to predict that hypocritically blaming is a bad thing to do. The issue, how-
ever, is explaining why, in the case of blame in particular, hypocrisy is not just bad, 
but it also affects one’s standing in the way in which it does. After all, this does not 
seem to generalize in an equally neat way: hypocritically laughing does not affect 
one’s standing to laugh, hypocritically promising does not affect one’s standing to 
promise, and so on.
In what follows, I will show how building the normativity of blame on general 
performance normativity 1. explains the necessity of standing to blame for fully 
appropriate blaming, and, furthermore, 2. Explains the non-hypocritical condition 
on standing to blame. If successful, Blame as Performance scores important points 
on normative fruitfulness.
Just like archery, blaming is a performance with a success condition: blaming is 
successful when it hits its proper target. I have argued above that blame is a second-
person-affecting negative-response performance constitutively aimed at a wrong-
doer for a wrong-doing. If this is so, successful blaming will target the blameworthy: 
when I blame you for being late for lunch, my blaming performance will be success-
ful if and only if you are blameworthy for being late for lunch.
Now, importantly, even if my blaming successfully picks out the blameworthy, 
it can fail to manifest the relevant competence—i.e., the type of competence cor-
responding to the type of blame at stake (moral competence for moral blame, epis-
temic competence for epistemic blame etc.). There are two ways in which this could 
happen: either I lack the relevant competence (no adroitness), or I have it but my 
successful blaming fails to manifest it (no aptness: although I am competent, on 
this particular occasion I only get it right by luck). Apt blame, then, will consist in 
blaming the blameworthy through the manifestation of the relevant type of blaming 
competence.
What might the relevant competence be? At a first stab, I want to suggest what is 
at stake is the normative competence of the relevant type, i.e. a reliable disposition 
to do well, normatively, for the type o normativity at stake, in normal conditions. To 
see the rationale behind this, note again that blaming is for wrong-doing, and wrong-
doing comes in broad normative types: moral, epistemic, prudential etc. I am not 
competent to blame for moral wrong-doing if I am not morally competent, as I am 
not competent to blame for epistemic wrong-doings if I am not epistemically com-
petent. If I am one who is disposed to regularly perform morally bad actions, I am 
not morally competent, and thereby I am not competent to blame for moral wrong-
doings. Similarly, if I am one who is disposed to regularly form beliefs based on 
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astrological readings, I am not epistemically competent, and thereby not competent 
to blame for epistemic wrong-doings.
Note, though, that one can be generally morally/epistemically/prudentially etc. 
competent, but not be competent with a particular, more narrowly individuated moral/
epistemic/prudential etc. matter. Conversely, one might be generally incompetent with 
moral/epistemic/prudential etc. normative matters, but do extremely well on a par-
ticular, narrowly individuated moral/epistemic/prudential matter. I might be always 
sloppily late for lunch, although I’m otherwise an extremely polite and dependable 
person. Or, to the contrary, I might be very punctual, but fail miserably in all other 
social-normative affairs. When this happens, we will want to say that what matters is 
the narrowly-individuated competence: I am competent when it comes to punctuality, 
and therefore I can competently identify instances of wrong-doing in this respect, and 
aptly blame the wrong-doer.
It turns out, then, that what maters for blame is competence with regard to compli-
ance with a particular norm: only if I am competent vis-à-vis punctuality, can I aptly 
blame you for being late for lunch. Only if I am competent when it comes to only form-
ing beliefs via reliable processes, can I aptly blame you for trusting astrological read-
ings. Only if I don’t myself binge on fashion shopping, am I competent to blame you 
for buying your sixth pair of green shoes.
This account nicely explains why standing to blame is necessary for apt blame: 
apt blame requires that a competence condition on the part of the blamer be met and 
manifest. Blame can be successful—if I blame the blameworthy—but inapt, in that 
my blaming the blameworthy does not occur in virtue of a competence of mine with 
respect to complying with the norm at stake.
In turn, note that the view also nicely explains the non-hypocrisy condition on stand-
ing to blame: competence with the relevant norm implies reliable disposition to comply 
with the norm in normal conditions. Hypocritical blamers are, in contrast, by stipula-
tion, people who have themselves engaged in similar wrongdoing in the past or have 
a disposition to do so. Note, too, that in order for standing to blame to be missing, 
it needs be that the blamer has engaged in similar wrongdoings to quite a significant 
extent/has a significant such disposition: if I’ve only been late for lunch once in my 
entire life, I still have standing to blame you for being late; if I am unreliable when it 
comes to coming on time, I don’t have standing to blame you. The reliability condition 
on competence delivers this very result: when I am often late for lunch myself, I am 
not competent with respect to following the norm of punctuality, and, thereby, I cannot 
aptly blame you for being late for lunch.
4  What BaP explains: the history of the analysis of blame
The next two sub-sections look at what this account of the nature of blame explains 
when it comes to cognitive, emotive and conative phenomena associated with blaming. 
Importantly, the ambition of this section is not critical: I am, at least for the most part, 
not going to aim to significantly advance the state of the art concerned with difficulties 
for extant accounts of blame. Rather, I will survey the relevant literature to the aim of 
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arguing that Blame as Performance is in a good position to explain both the advantages 
and the weaknesses of the competition.
4.1  Blame traditionalism and directions of fit
I would like to go back to the history of the analysis of blame project. Several 
people think blaming is roughly tantamount to judging blameworthy (e.g. Haji 
1998; Hieronymi 2004; Scanlon 1986; Smart 1961; Watson 1996; Zimmerman 
1988). According to Zimmerman, for instance, when we blame someone, we 
judge that there is a “discredit” or “debit” in his ledger, that his “moral standing” 
has been “diminished” (Zimmerman 1988: p. 38). In a similar vein, on Gary Wat-
son’s account, to blame someone is to judge that they have failed with respect to 
some standard of excellence.
There are, though, two notable worries for cognitive accounts, concerning 
the necessity and, respectively, the sufficiency direction of analyzing blame in 
terms of judging blameworthy. If successful, these objections seem to suggest 
that blaming and judging blameworthy, while they may often go hand in hand, 
survive perfectly fine without one another. Consider, against the sufficiency direc-
tion: I can judge you blameworthy for being late for lunch and still not blame 
you—after all, I’ve done it myself in the past, and it’s not that big a deal any-
way; nobody’s perfect (Kenner 1967; Coates and Tognazzini 2012). Conversely, 
against the necessity direction, consider irrational blame; classical cases involve 
benighted moral agents: I see how you could not help but do what you did, you’re 
blameless in virtue of your social determinations, but I cannot help but blame you 
for it (Pickard 2013).
The account of Blame as Performance has the theoretical resources to explain this 
phenomenon: judgments of blameworthiness, while often associated with blame, are 
metaphysically distinct entities. It is easy to see what went wrong if we go back 
to the judgment/assertion parallel: the speech-act correspondent for a judgment that 
you are blameworthy is not the speech act of blaming, but the speech act of assert-
ing: ‘You are blameworthy.’ The latter is distinct from the speech act of blaming: 
it is not a performative, but an assertive. It merely describes the world, it does not 
affect it. It only has a word-to-world direction of fit.
Since blame is a second-person retributive performance, though, it will be often 
associated with judgments of blameworthiness: retribution constitutively aims to 
match desert. Normally, when I do something negative to you in response to your 
being a (perceived) wrong-doer, I aim to get it right: I aim to do it in virtue of your 
actually being a wrong-do-er. This model, however, suffers exceptions, and the clas-
sical counterexamples to cognitivism track these exceptions: in particular, cases 
where I blame irrationally, i.e. in spite of the fact that I don’t judge you blamewor-
thy, will be explained on BaP as garden variety cases of irrational action against 
one’s best judgement. Also, the classical cases put forth against sufficiency have 
straightforward explanations on BaP: first, if blame is an action, in line with other 
actions, it is hardly surprising that I can judge that you are worthy of phi-ing and yet 
not do phi to you. In particular, this will easily be the case when I lack the authority 
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to do phi: I can judge that you are worth punishment, for instance, but since I lack 
the authority to punish you, not act on my judgment. In line with this general model, 
counterexamples to the cognitivist’s sufficiency claim, unsurprisingly, ride on lack 
of standing to blame.
Let us move on to emotions and desires: The disconnect between blaming and 
judging blameworthy led some people to believe blame was not a cognitive affair, 
but rather an emotion or set of emotions.20 When we blame, they argue, we feel 
resentment, indignation, anger and the like for some wrongdoing (Bell 2013; Straw-
son 1962; Wallace 1994; Wolf 2011).
Worries have been put forth for the necessity direction of emotivist analyses. The 
problem is that all these emotions, while characteristic to instances of blame for 
fairly serious breaches of moral norms (i.e. murder), are not plausibly necessarily 
present in other, less highbrow types of blame. Take, for instance, moral blame for 
minor wrongdoings: I’m 5 minutes late for lunch. Yes, I did break my promise, so 
if I did it out of sloppiness, and you care about punctuality, you may end up blam-
ing me. Still, anger, resentment and indignation (no matter how ‘light’) seem like a 
disproportionate reaction. Consider, also, the case of epistemic blame21: if you’re 
looking straight at the vase but believe there is no vase in the room, all else equal, 
you are epistemically blameworthy and subject to proper criticism: ‘Can’t you see 
the vase? You’re looking straight at it!’. However, it seems rather peculiar for me 
to resent you or feel indignation in relation to your epistemic failure, absent other 
normative considerations. To the contrary, your epistemic unresponsiveness is rather 
hilarious. Similarly, take prudential blame: I can surely blame you for wasting your 
money on your sixth pair of green shoes, while not feeling particularly emotional 
about it.
Several people in the traditionalist literature have proposed conative analyses of 
blame. The most influential account of this sort is George Sher’s (2006) conative 
account. Sher (2006) endorses a “two-tiered” account of moral blame “which takes 
it to consist of a characteristic set of affective and behavioural dispositions that are 
organised around a characteristic type of desire-judgment pair” (2006: pp. 14–15). 
What Sher ads to judgments of wrongness is a backwards-looking desire “that the 
person in question not have performed his past bad act” (2006: p. 112). On top of 
this, it should be the case that this judgment-desire pair triggers dispositions to 
behave in characteristically emotional ways, such as feeling badly about not getting 
what one wants, publicly expressing the unsatisfied desire etc. Thus, Sher suggests 
that the negative emotions typical of blame are an example of how one feels badly 
when one’s desires are frustrated.
Unsurprisingly, this type of view is also bound to inherit the objections to the 
necessity of judging blameworthy for blaming (nested in the possibility of irrational 
blame). Furthermore, worries have been expressed that there are cases when the rel-
evant desire that you have not done what you did is absent while blame is present. 
After all, it may well be that you lie to me, I judge you are blameworthy and blame 
20 Cognitivism about emotions bracketed, of course.
21 See Brown (2018), Boult (2020), and Piovarchy (2020) for recent work on epistemic blame.
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you for it, but I don’t desire you hadn’t done it because, by mere accident, I end up 
better off because of your lie. Furthermore, it looks as though in cases of non-moral 
blame, the relevant desire is usually not present, if not even outright inappropriate: 
I don’t have any desire concerning your epistemic or your shoe shopping blunders 
(why would I care?), but it still seems perfectly appropriate to blame you for your 
irresponsible behavior.
Against the sufficiency direction involved in Sher’s view, Angela Smith argues 
that in some cases, say in “the reactions of a mother whose son is blameworthy for 
[a] crime” (Smith 2013: p. 35), the relevant judgment-desire pair might be present 
without blame. Furthermore, note that, compatibly, Smith’s mother may also display 
some of the dispositions to behave in characteristically emotional ways, such as feel-
ing miserable about what happened, publicly expressing the fact that she wished the 
son did not do it etc.
I want to argue that BaP explains what went wrong with both the emotivist and 
the conativist analyses: the problem here is that there is a mis-match of direction of 
fit. Emotions, like cognitions, tell us something about how the world is (pleasant, 
unpleasant—mind-to-world fit) and, like desires, they motivate us to act in various 
ways to change the world (world-to-mind). First, if blame is an action, it misses the 
characteristically cognitive mind to world direction of fit, in that it does not describe 
the world, it only affects it. Further on, when it comes to changing the world, the 
important difference between emotions and desires on one hand, and blaming on the 
other concerns the success condition: emotions and desires motivate us to change 
the world, while blaming successfully does so. In this, the account of blame as per-
formance explains why emotions (anger, resentment) and desires (that the wrong-
doer had not done the deed) can come apart from blaming, but often go hand in 
hand: first, blame does not require valuations of state of the world: this is what the 
case of irrational blame teaches us. That being said, in line with other retributive 
actions, it is often associated with—indeed, often triggered by—bad feelings about 
what happened. Second, while desires and emotions merely motivate one to respond 
to wrongdoing, blame successfully does so: in many cases, the motivation and the 
success will come together: I will be motivated to respond to your wrong-doing, and 
I will also successfully do so. This, of course, though, need not be the case: motiva-
tion and successful action can come apart.
4.2  Blame functionalism and the mental/spoken blame parallel
In view of the history of unsuccessful dismantling analyses of blame, more recently, 
several people (e.g. Bennett 2013; Duff 1986; Fricker 2016; McKenna 2012; Sliwa 
2021; Smith 2013; Vargas 2013), propose to shed light on the nature of this phe-
nomenon by looking into the function the practice of blame serves for us. Instead of 
identifying blame with any particular attitude or combination of attitudes, functional 
accounts of blame identify blame by its functional role.
What unites all functional accounts of blame in the literature is their focus on 
the practice of communicating blame. The thought is that identifying the function 
of our practice of blaming is going to shed light on the nature of blame. How is 
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this supposed to happen? Blame is internally very diverse. So maybe it is a practice 
essentially defined by its function, which, in turn, is multiply realizable. Take a para-
digmatic case of functional item: for instance, keys. They come in many shapes and 
colors, and it’s hard to find a common denominator that is also in any way informa-
tive. What unifies the tokens of the type is rather their function: opening/closing 
locks. As opposed to keys, bachelors, for instance, have an informative common 
metaphysical denominator: they are unmarried men. The thought, then must be that 
blame is more like keys than like bachelors. What is defining of the practice is its 
function, and the latter can be fulfilled in many ways—blame is internally diverse.
According to Fricker (2016), the function of communicative blame is epistemic: 
it resides in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer’s 
moral understandings. It aims to bring the wrongdoer to see or fully acknowledge 
the moral significance of what they have done or failed to do. By communicatively 
blaming you for leaving the kitchen door open, I aim to make you see that what 
you did was wrong—you were not very considerate, and now my cat ran out!—and 
feel remorse for having done it. This aim need not, of course, always be present as 
an intention in the psychology of the communicative blamer; rather, according to 
Fricker, the aim is a function of the type of speech act blame is, the nature of its 
illocutionary point.
This alignment of moral understanding, in turn, has a social function: it is aimed 
at correcting the future behavior of the wrongdoer. I blame you for leaving the 
kitchen door open in the hope that you will recognize how this was not very consid-
erate, and be more careful in the future. Finally, Fricker thinks that all other types of 
blame can be understood as derivative of communicative blame.
Antony Duff has proposed a similar understanding of the aim of blame, according 
to which it is “an attempt to communicate to the wrong-doer a moral understanding 
of his wrong-doing; to bring him to recognize his guilt and repent what he has done 
(Duff 1986: p. 70).
More recently, Sliwa (2021) also proposes a function-based account of blame. On 
her account, the latter consists in creating common knowledge of reparative duties 
and claim-rights for wrongdoing.
In sum, then, according to these philosophers, the function of our practice of 
blaming is mainly epistemic: it aims at effecting changes in the epistemic status of 
the participants—be it their moral understanding or their knowledge of post-wrong-
doing duties and rights.
Other alternative popular functionalist views on blame take the relevant function 
to be one of expressing protest or disapproval in the face of wrongdoing. According 
to Michael McKenna, for instance, blame is conversational, and thus functions to 
continue a conversation started by the blamee’s wrongful action. McKenna claims 
that all reactive attitudes and their expressions serve this function. According Smith 
(2013), blaming functions as a form of protest. For Smith, when we modify our atti-
tudes and intentions towards the blame, and this serves a particular function, namely 
that of protest, it counts as an instance of blame.
There are two main worries for blame functionalism: one is methodological, the 
other one concerns the details of the accounts under discussion.
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I will start with the latter: Criticism and blame are two distinct normative catego-
ries; furthermore, the corresponding speech acts can also come apart. I can criticize 
you (‘What you did was wrong’) but fail to blame you (…although I must say I’ve 
done it myself in the past, I can sympathise!). Interestingly enough, note that criti-
cizing in speech is weaker than blaming: When I utter ‘I blame you for phi-ing!’ I 
both blame and criticize you. The converse need not be the case: I can criticize you 
for phi-ing without blaming you (after all, nobody’s perfect).
Now, note that the functions proposed in the literature for the practice of blam-
ing—epistemic functions, protest functions, communicating disapproval functions—
are perfectly well served by the weaker speech act—the speech act of criticizing. 
That is because, just like blaming, criticizing communicates to you my normative 
take on things. In a nutshell, by merely criticizing you for having phi-ed, I can: 
increase the alignment of our moral understandings and your moral knowledge, pro-
test your actions, express my disapproval, without necessarily also blaming you for 
what you did. If that is the case, though, blaming you—on top of mere criticism—
seems like a normative overkill. If the function is perfectly well served by mere criti-
cism, why have a stronger practice to the same effect? Consider, for a visual analogy, 
asserting in normal tone and shouting. The function of asserting that p is to inform 
you that p. Furthermore, in normal conditions, assertion is perfectly capable to ful-
fill its function. It seems, then, unnecessary (not to mention outrageously impolite) 
to shout that p at you, if what I’m up to is merely informing you that p. More needs 
to be the case for the stronger speech act to be warranted: maybe I also want to sig-
nal an emergency (‘Your train is leaving!!!!’), for instance. Whatever it is, shouting 
for mere informing is overkilling. Similarly, blaming rather than merely criticizing 
for generating normative knowledge or understanding, or for communicating disap-
proval or protesting is normative overkilling.
Criticism and blame can come apart. Furthermore, there are instances in which 
criticism is appropriate while blame isn’t; i.e., instances in which not only they do 
come apart, but they should come apart (Kelp and Simion 2017). Actions are often 
performed in the public sphere and, as such, are observable by others, who may pick 
up the forms of behaviour exhibited. When you fail to call Uno when playing your 
penultimate card in a game of Uno, and so violate a rule of the game, this may be 
observed by someone else who will pick up your behaviour and, as a result, may 
violate the rule in the future, too. By allowing for criticisms of actions that violate 
specific norms we can work against the spread of norm-violating forms of behav-
iour. Since this is a good thing, it makes sense for us to allow for such criticisms. 
At the same time, we may also want to grant that a norm has been broken blame-
lessly by the agent. We do not want to hold the norm violation against her: she was 
blamelessly ignorant, things were blamelessly out of control and so on. If so, there is 
excellent reason for us to allow criticisability relative to a specific norm and blame-
lessness relative to the very same norm to coexist.
In sum: criticism and blame can come apart and there are instances in which they 
should come apart; also, the communicative function at stake is fulfilled by mere 
criticism, which is the weaker speech act. If this is so, looking at the communicative 
function will shed little light on the nature of blame: after all, similarly, we are not 
going to understand the nature of shouting by looking at the function of informing.
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But couldn’t someone like Fricker reply that mere criticism, while reaching the 
aim of bringing about alignment in moral understanding, it does so via the wrong 
means?22 After all, according to Fricker’s view, the communicative function of 
blame is to bring about alignment in moral understandings via inspriring remorse 
in the blamed party. The thought then would be that what makes blame so effec-
tive in particular contexts is precisely this way of bringing about alignment in moral 
understanding. While criticism (of someone’s conduct) may well serve the function 
of bringing about alignment in moral understandings, maybe it cannot reliably serve 
the function of bringing about said alignment via inspiring remorse.
I don’t think this reply will work well, for three main reasons: first, building the 
means to alignment in moral understanding in the content of the function leaves the 
account poorly motivated: recall that, according to Fricker herself, the final point of 
all this is to correct the future behavior of the wrongdoer. To this end, an alignment 
in moral understanding seems sufficient, no matter how it may be brought about—be 
it via remorse or via, say, brainwashing. Second, considerations pertaining to the 
effectiveness of one means over the other are inconsequential, insofar as the function 
is fulfilled often enough (this, indeed, is the case with functions in general); in turn, 
whether criticism fulfills the function often enough is an empirical question. One 
thing that seems plausible, though,—which brings me to my third point—is that the 
difference between the effectiveness of the two—blame and criticism—cannot be 
very large, since the two speech acts are most often indistinguishable—with only 
one notable but infrequently encountered exception: explicit blaming.
Maybe, then, we can keep the functionalist analysis proposed in its broad shape, 
but abandon the details—i.e. the particular communicative functions identified? One 
initially promising way to do this, for instance, might be to identify a second-per-
sonal function of communicative blame: rather than targeting the normative prop-
erties of the target action (wrongness etc., which, if I am right, is the proper func-
tion of criticism), on this view blame targets the normative properties of the blamee 
(fault, responsibility for wrong action). In this, blame’s function will be distinct from 
that of criticism, and therefore better identify the phenomenon we are interested in.23
This brings us to the methodological worry: focusing on the communicative 
nature of an important part of the practice may easily be misleading. Undeniably, 
we sometimes (often!) only blame people in our heads. Furthermore, we sometimes 
blame them in speech while mental blame is absent. If that is the case, by looking 
at the function of our practice of blaming at large, we risk identifying a function 
that is only associated with communicating blame, rather than blaming. To see the 
worry further, consider the parallel case of judgment and assertion. Just like men-
tal and spoken blame, the one is the inner counterpart of the other. Now, plausibly, 
the (main) function of assertion is communicative: generating a particular epistemic 
standing in the hearer (knowledge, true belief etc.). This, however, will not yet tell us 
anything interesting about the nature of judgment, in virtue of the fact that judgment 
22 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.
23 Many thanks to Ben Colburn for pressing this point.
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does not share this communicative function. To the contrary, this particular commu-
nicative characteristic is what sets judgment and assertion apart.
What can do the trick, however, in shedding light on the nature of judgment, is an 
account of the nature of assertion: if assertion stands to judgment like outer to inner, 
judgment is sub-vocalised assertion. Take a X view of the nature of assertion, then, 
and you have a view on the nature of judgment: subvocalized X. That is precisely 
the framework that BaP relies on for blame: Bap stats with the nature, not the func-
tion, of vocalized blaming, and derives the nature of mental blame accordingly.
Furthermore, BaP can also easily make sense of the intuitions behind the several 
functionalist views we have been looking at: after all, if I am right and blaming is a 
second-personal retributive performance, it is hardly surprising that it will, in line 
with other retributive performances like punishment and downgrading, often serve 
several communicative functions: to communicate that the wrong-doer is being 
held responsible, that the normative landscape is changed in the light of the wrong-
doer’s wrongdoing, etc. Also, in virtue of being a second-person performance, like 
punishing and downgrading, it will be an efficient tool in the service of protest and 
expressing disapproval against the wrong-doer. Importantly, though, all the relevant 
functions will be targeting the wrong-doers rather than the wrongdoing: blame, as 
opposed to criticism, is always about the doer not the doing. In this, BaP accounts 
for the fact that criticism can be appropriate when blame is not: cases of blameless 
norm-violation are cases in point.
5  Concluding remarks
I have developed a view according to which blame is a species of performance. Cru-
cially, the argument for the view relied on a minimal number of widely accepted 
claims pertaining to the nature of the speech act of explicit blaming and the met-
aphysical parallelism between mental and spoken blame. In this, the account pro-
posed comes with a high score for prior plausibility. Furthermore, I have argued that 
BaP is theoretically fruitful in many further ways: first, it gives us a straightforward 
way to understand the normativity of blaming. Second, it neatly explains both the 
advantages and weaknesses of the most prominent competing accounts.
To conclude, I want to briefly suggest that the view is also empirically adequate, 
in that it explains several psychological phenomena often associated with blaming. 
A few central cases discussed in the literature include:
(1) The force of blame: it seems that, when we are blamed, we tend to not remain 
indifferent; furthermore, several people think that blame has the power to affect 
the normative landscape (in the same way as e.g. promising), by creating new 
obligations/permissions (e.g. Sliwa 2021). The view proposed here nicely 
explains the force of blame, i.e. why it is not easy to disregard: after all, on 
this account, when I blame you, I am actively doing something to you, I am 
not merely judging or feeling something about you. Other’s retributive actions 
against us are less easy to ignore than their judgments and feelings about us. If 
this is not obvious yet, consider the difference in force between: my judging/
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feeling that you deserve punishment and my actually punishing you. Further-
more, BaP also (arguably, uniquely) neatly explains the widely spread intuition 
that, after blaming, the normative landscape is crucially affected: emotions, 
judgments and desires do not affect the common normative ground, in virtue of 
either not having the right direction of fit (judgments) or not entailing a success 
condition (emotions, desires); actions do: they change the world successfully.
(2) Blame’s internal metaphysical diversity: we can blame by explicitly uttering 
‘I blame you for being late for lunch!,’, but we can also blame by merely say-
ing something like ‘You should not have come so late to lunch, it was not nice 
of you to make me wait!;’ Blame as Performance also makes easy sense of 
this phenomenon: recall the distinction form Searle, between performatives and 
performances. I can blame you by uttering ‘I blame you!,’ but I can also blame 
you by merely saying something like ‘That is a terrible thing to do!.’ When I 
utter ‘I blame you!,’ my speech act is a performative, with a double direction 
of fit. When I utter ‘That is a terrible thing to do!,’ I blame you without, at the 
same time, describing what I am doing; my speech act is a performance, with a 
world-to-word direction of fit.
(3) The normative diversity of blame (we can blame people for moral, prudential, 
epistemic etc. failures). Blame as Performance has no trouble accommodating 
different kinds of blame: moral, prudential, epistemic etc. Recall the model I 
have proposed: blame is a second-person-affecting negative-response perfor-
mance constitutively aimed at a wrong-doer for a wrong-doing. The relevant 
wrongdoing can be moral, prudential, epistemic or of any other normative kind.
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